Can polls be reliable?

Election polls in many countries have seemed unusually unreliable recently. Why? And can they be fixed?

The most basic observation is that if one has a random sample of a population in which x% has some attribute then it is reasonable to estimate that x% of the whole population has that attribute, and that this estimate will tend to be more accurate the larger the sample is. In some polls sample size can be an issue, but not in the main political polls.

A fundamental problem with most polls is that the ‘random’ sample may not be uniformly distributed, with some sub-groups over or under represented. Political polls have some additional issues, that are sometimes blamed:

  • People with certain opinions may be reluctant to express them, or may even mislead.
  • There may be a shift in opinions with time, due to campaigns or events.
  • Different groups may differ in whether they actually vote, for example depending on the weather.

I also think that in the UK the trend to postal voting may have confused things, as postal voters will have missed out on the later stages of campaigns, and on later events. (Which were significant in the UK 2017 general election.)

Pollsters have a lot of experience at compensating for these distortions, and are increasingly using ‘sophisticated mathematical tools’. How is this possible, and is there any residual uncertainty?

Back to mathematics, suppose that we have a science-like situation in which we know which factors (e.g. gender, age, social class ..) are relevant. With a large enough sample we can partition the results by combination of factors, measure the proportions for each combination, and then combine these proportions, weighting by the prevalence of the combinations in the whole population. (More sophisticated approaches are used for smaller samples, but they only reduce the statistical reliability.)

Systematic errors can creep in in two ways:

  1. Instead of using just the poll data, some ‘laws of politics’ (such as the effect of rain) or other heuristics (such as that the swing among postal votes will be similar to that for votes in person) may be wrong.
  2. An important factor is missed. (For example, people with teenage children or grandchildren may vote differently from their peers when student fees are an issue.)

These issues have analogues in the science lab. In the first place one is using the wrong theory to interpret the data, and so the results are corrupted. In the second case one has some unnoticed ‘uncontrolled variable’ that can really confuse things.

A polling method using fixed factors and laws will only be reliable when they reasonably accurately the attributes of interest, and not when ‘the nature of politics’ is changing, as it often does and as it seems to be right now in North America and Europe. (According to game theory one should expect such changes when coalitions change or are under threat, as they are.) To do better, the polling organisation would need to understand the factors that the parties were bringing into play at least as well as the parties themselves, and possibly better. This seems unlikely, at least in the UK.

What can be done?

It seems to me that polls used to be relatively easy to interpret, possibly because they were simpler. Our more sophisticated contemporary methods make more detailed assumptions. To interpret them we would need to know what these assumptions were. We could then ‘aim off’, based on our own judgment. But this would involve pollsters in publishing some details of their methods, which they are naturally loth to do. So what could be done? Maybe we could have some agreed simple methods and publish findings as ‘extrapolations’ to inform debate, rather than predictions. We could then factor in our own assumptions. (For example, our assumptions about students turnout.)

So, I don’t think that we can expect reliable poll findings that are predictions, but possibly we could have useful poll findings that would inform debate and allow us to take our own views. (A bit like any ‘big data’.)

Dave Marsay

 

Mathematical modelling

I had the good fortune to attend a public talk on mathematical modelling, organised by the University of Birmingham (UK). The speaker, Dr Nira Chamberlain CMath FIMA CSci, is a council member of the appropriate institution, and so may reasonably be thought to be speaking for mathematicians generally.

He observed that there were many professional areas that used mathematics as a tool, and that they generally failed to see the need for professional mathematicians as such. He thought that mathematical modelling was one area where – at least for the more important problems – mathematicians ought to be involved. He gave examples of modelling, including one of the financial crisis.

The main conclusion seemed very reasonable, and in line with the beliefs of most ‘right thinking’ mathematicians. But on reflection, I wonder if my non-mathematician professional colleagues would accept it. In 19th century professional mathematicians were proclaiming it a mathematical fact that the physical world conformed to classical geometry. On this basis, mathematicians do not seem to have any special ability to produce valid models. Indeed, in the run up to the financial crash there were too many professional mathematicians who were advocating some mainstream mathematical models of finance and economies in which the crash was impossible.

In Dr Chamberlain’s own model of the crash, it seems that deregulation and competition led to excessive risk taking, which risks eventually materialised. A colleague who is a professional scientist but not a professional mathematician has advised me that this general model was recognised by the UK at the time of our deregulation, but that it was assumed (as Greenspan did) that somehow some institution would step in to foreclose this excessive risk taking. To me, the key thing to note is that the risks being taken were systemic and not necessarily recognised by those taking them. To me, the virtue of a model does not just depend on it being correct in some abstract sense, but also that ‘has traction’ with relevant policy and decision makers and takers. Thus, reflecting on the talk, I am left accepting the view of many of my colleagues that some mathematical models are too important to be left to mathematicians.

If we have a thesis and antithesis, then the synthesis that I and my colleagues have long come to is that important mathematical model needs to be a collaborative endeavour, including mathematicians as having a special role in challenging, interpret and (potentially) developing the model, including developing (as Dr C said) new mathematics where necessary. A modelling team will often need mathematicians ‘on tap’ to apply various methods and theories, and this is common. But what is also needed is a mathematical insight into the appropriateness of these tools and the meaning of the results. This requires people who are more concerned with their mathematical integrity than in satisfying their non-mathematical pay-masters. It seems to me that these are a sub-set of those that are generally regarded as ‘professional’. How do we identify such people?

Dave Marsay 

 

Uncertainty is not just probability

I have just had published my paper, based on the discussion paper referred to in a previous post. In Facebook it is described as:

An understanding of Keynesian uncertainties can be relevant to many contemporary challenges. Keynes was arguably the first person to put probability theory on a sound mathematical footing. …

So it is not just for economists. I could be tempted to discuss the wider implications.

Comments are welcome here, at the publisher’s web site or on Facebook. I’m told that it is also discussed on Google+, Twitter and LinkedIn, but I couldn’t find it – maybe I’ll try again later.

Dave Marsay

Artificial Intelligence?

The subject of ‘Artificial Intelligence’ (AI) has long provided ample scope for long and inconclusive debates. Wikipedia seems to have settled on a view, that we may take as straw-man:

Every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it. [Dartmouth Conference, 1956] The appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds. [John Searle’s straw-man hypothesis]

Readers of my blog will realise that I agree with Searle that his hypothesis is wrong, but for different reasons. It seems to me that mainstream AI (mAI) is about being able to take instruction. This is a part of learning, but by no means all. Thus – I claim – mAI is about a sub-set of intelligence. In many organisational settings it may be that sub-set which the organisation values. It may even be that an AI that ‘thought for itself’ would be a danger. For example, in old discussions about whether or not some type of AI could ever act as a G.P. (General Practitioner – first line doctor) the underlying issue has been whether G.P.s ‘should’ think for themselves, or just apply their trained responses. My own experience is that sometimes G.P.s doubt the applicability of what they have been taught, and that sometimes this is ‘a good thing’. In effect, we sometimes want to train people, or otherwise arrange for them to react in predictable ways, as if they were machines. mAI can create better machines, and thus has many key roles to play. But between mAI and ‘superhuman intelligence’  there seems to be an important gap: the kind of intelligence that makes us human. Can machines display such intelligence? (Can people, in organisations that treat them like machines?)

One successful mainstream approach to AI is to work with probabilities, such a P(A|B) (‘the probability of A given B’), making extensive use of Bayes’ rule, and such an approach is sometimes thought to be ‘logical’, ‘mathematical, ‘statistical’ and ‘scientific’. But, mathematically, we can generalise the approach by taking account of some context, C, using Jack Good’s notation P(A|B:C) (‘the probability of A given B, in the context C’). AI that is explicitly or implicitly statistical is more successful when it operates within a definite fixed context, C, for which the appropriate probabilities are (at least approximately) well-defined and stable. For example, training within an organisation will typically seek to enable staff (or machines) to characterise their job sufficiently well for it to become routine. In practice ‘AI’-based machines often show a little intelligence beyond that described above: they will monitor the situation and ‘raise an exception’ when the situation is too far outside what it ‘expects’. But this just points to the need for a superior intelligence to resolve the situation. Here I present some thoughts.

When we state ‘P(A|B)=p’ we are often not just asserting the probability relationship: it is usually implicit that ‘B’ is the appropriate condition to consider if we are interested in ‘A’. Contemporary mAI usually takes the conditions a given, and computes ‘target’ probabilities from given probabilities. Whilst this requires a kind of intelligence, it seems to me that humans will sometimes also revise the conditions being considered, and this requires a different type of intelligence (not just the ability to apply Bayes’ rule). For example, astronomers who refine the value of relevant parameters are displaying some intelligence and are ‘doing science’, but those first in the field, who determined which parameters are relevant employed a different kind of intelligence and were doing a different kind of science. What we need, at least, is an appropriate way of interpreting and computing ‘probability’ to support this enhanced intelligence.

The notions of Whitehead, Keynes, Russell, Turing and Good seem to me a good start, albeit they need explaining better – hence this blog. Maybe an example is economics. The notion of probability routinely used would be appropriate if we were certain about some fundamental assumptions. But are we? At least we should realise that it is not logical to attempt to justify those assumptions by reasoning using concepts that implicitly rely on them.

Dave Marsay

Evolution of Pragmatism?

A common ‘pragmatic’ approach is to keep doing what you normally do until you hit a snag, and (only) then to reconsider. Whereas Lamarckian evolution would lead to the ‘survival of the fittest’, with everyone adapting to the current niche, tending to yield a homogenous population, Darwinian evolution has survival of the maximal variety of all those who can survive, with characteristics only dying out when they are not viable. This evolution of diversity makes for greater resilience, which is maybe why ‘pragmatic’ Darwinian evolution has evolved.

The products of evolution are generally also pragmatic, in that they have virtually pre-programmed behaviours which ‘unfold’ in the environment. Plants grow and procreate, while animals have a richer variety of behaviours, but still tend just to do what they do. But humans can ‘think for themselves’ and be ‘creative’, and so have the possibility of not being just pragmatic.

I was at a (very good) lecture by Alice Roberts last night on the evolution of technology. She noted that many creatures use tools, but humans seem to be unique in that at some critical population mass the manufacture and use of tools becomes sustained through teaching, copying and co-operation. It occurred to me that much of this could be pragmatic. After all, until recently development has been very slow, and so may well have been driven by specific practical problems rather than continual searching for improvements. Also, the more recent upswing of innovation seems to have been associated with an increased mixing of cultures and decreased intolerance for people who think for themselves.

In biological evolution mutations can lead to innovation, so evolution is not entirely pragmatic, but their impact is normally limited by the need to fit the current niche, so evolution typically appears to be pragmatic. The role of mutations is more to increase the diversity of behaviours within the niche, rather than innovation as such.

In social evolution there will probably always have been mavericks and misfits, but the social pressure has been towards conformity. I conjecture that such an environment has favoured a habit of pragmatism. These days, it seems to me, a better approach would be more open-minded, inclusive and exploratory, but possibly we do have a biologically-conditioned tendency to be overly pragmatic: to confuse conventions for facts and  heuristics for laws of nature, and not to challenge widely-held beliefs.

The financial crash of 2008 was blamed by some on mathematics. This seems ridiculous. But the post Cold War world was largely one of growth with the threat of nuclear devastation much diminished, so it might be expected that pragmatism would be favoured. Thus powerful tools (mathematical or otherwise) could be taken up and exploited pragmatically, without enough consideration of the potential dangers. It seems to me that this problem is much broader than economics, but I wonder what the cure is, apart from better education and more enlightened public debate?

Dave Marsay

 

 

Traffic bunching

In heavy traffic, such as on motorways in rush-hour, there is often oscillation in speed and there can even be mysterious ’emergent’ halts. The use of variable speed limits can result in everyone getting along a given stretch of road quicker.

Soros (worth reading) has written an article that suggests that this is all to do with the humanity and ‘thinking’ of the drivers, and that something similar is the case for economic and financial booms and busts. This might seem to indicate that ‘mathematical models’ were a part of our problems, not solutions. So I suggest the following thought experiment:

Suppose a huge number of  identical driverless cars with deterministic control functions all try to go along the same road, seeking to optimise performance in terms of ‘progress’ and fuel economy. Will they necessarily succeed, or might there be some ‘tragedy of the commons’ that can only be resolved by some overall regulation? What are the critical factors? Is the nature of the ‘brains’ one of them?

Are these problems the preserve of psychologists, or does mathematics have anything useful to say?

Dave Marsay

JIC, Syria and Uncertainty

This page considers the case that the Assad regime used gas against the rebels on 21st August 2013 from a theory of evidence perspective. For a broader account, see Wikipedia.

The JIC Assessment

The JIC concluded on 27th that it was:

highly likely that the Syrian regime was responsible.

In the covering letter (29th) the chair said:

Against that background, the JIC concluded that it is highly likely that the regime was responsible for the CW attacks on 21 August. The JIC had high confidence in all of its assessments except in relation to the regime’s precise motivation for carrying out an attack of this scale at this time – though intelligence may increase our confidence in the future.

A cynic or pedant might note the caveat:

The paper’s key judgements, based on the information and intelligence available to us as of 25 August, are attached.

Mathematically-based analysis

From a mathematical point of view, the JIC report is an ‘utterance’, and one needs to consider the context in which it was produced. Hopefully, best practice would include identifying the key steps in the conclusion and seeking out and hastening any possible contrary reports. Thus one might reasonably suppose that the letter on the 29th reflected all obviously relevant information available up to the ends of the 28th, but perhaps not some other inputs, such as ‘big data’, that only yield intelligence after extensive processing and analysis.

But what is the chain of reasoning (29th)?

It is being claimed, including by the regime, that the attacks were either faked or undertaken by the Syrian Armed Opposition. We have tested this assertion using a wide range of intelligence and open sources, and invited HMG and outside experts to help us establish whether such a thing is possible. There is no credible intelligence or other evidence to substantiate the claims or the possession of CW by the opposition. The JIC has therefore concluded that there are no plausible alternative scenarios to regime responsibility.

The JIC had high confidence in all of its assessments except in relation to the regime’s precise motivation for carrying out an attack of this scale at this time – though intelligence may increase our confidence in the future.

The report of the 27th is more nuanced:

There is no credible evidence that any opposition group has used CW. A number continue to seek a CW capability, but none currently has the capability to conduct a CW attack on this scale.

Russia claims to have a ‘good degree of confidence’ that the attack was an ‘opposition provocation’ but has announced that they support an investigation into the incident. …

In contrast, concerning Iraqi WMD, we were told that “lack of evidence is not evidence of lack”. But mathematics is not so rigid: it depends on one’s intelligence sources and analysis. Presumably in 2003 we lacked the means to detect Iraqi CW, but now – having learnt the lesson – we would know almost as soon as any one of a number of disparate groups acquires CW.  Many outside the intelligence community might not find this credible, leading to a lack of confidence in the report. Others would take the JIC’s word for it. But while the JIC may have evidence that supports their rating, it seems to me that they have not even alluded to a key part of it.

Often, of course, an argument may be technically flawed but still lead to a correct conclusion. To fix the argument one would want a much greater understanding of the situation. For example, the Russians seem to suggest that one opposition group would be prepared to gas another, presumably to draw the US and others into the war. Is the JIC saying that this is not plausible, or simply that no such group (yet) has the means? Without clarity, it is difficult for an outsider to asses the report and draw their own conclusion.

Finally, it is notable that regime responsibility for the attack of the 21st is rated ‘highly likely’, the same as their responsibility for previous attacks. Yet mathematically the rating should depend on what is called ‘the likelihood’, which one would normally expect to increase with time. Hence one would expect the rating to increase from possible (in the immediate aftermath) through likely to highly likely, as the kind of issues described above are dealt with. This unexpectedly high rating calls for an explanation, which would need to address the most relevant factors.

Anticipating the UN Inspectors

The UN weapons inspectors are expected to produce much relevant evidence. For example, it may be that even if an opposition group had CW an attack would necessarily lack some key signatures. But, from a mathematical point of view, one cannot claim that one explanation is ‘highly likely’ without considering all the alternatives and taking full account of how the evidence was obtained. It is quite true, as the PM argued, that there will always be gaps that require judgement to span. But we should strive to make the gap as slight as possible, and to be clear about what it is. While one would not want a JIC report to be phrased in terms of mathematics, it would seem that appropriate mathematics could be a valuable aid to critical thinking. Hopefully we shall soon have an assessment that genuinely rates ‘highly likely’ independently of any esoteric expertise, whether intelligence or mathematics.

Updates

30th August: US

The US assessment concludes that the attack was by Assad’s troops, using rockets to deliver a nerve agent, following their usual procedures. This ought to be confirmed or disconfirmed by the inspectors, with reasonable confidence. Further, the US claim ‘high confidence’ in their assessment, rather than very high confidence. Overall, the US assessment appears to be about what one would expect if Assad’s troops were responsible.

31st August: Blog

There is a good private-enterprise analysis of the open-source material. It makes a good case that the rockets’ payloads were not very dense, and probably a chemical gas. However, it points out that only the UN inspectors could determine if the payload was a prohibited substance, or some other substance such as is routinely used by respectable armies and police forces.

It makes no attribution of the rockets. The source material is clearly intended to show them being used by the Assad regime, but there is no discussion of whether or not any rebel groups could have made, captured or otherwise acquired them.

2nd September: France

The French have declassified a dossier. Again, it presents assertion and argumentation rather than evidence. The key points seem to be:

  • A ‘large’ amount of gas was used.
  • Rockets were probably used (presumably many).
  • No rebel group has the ability to fire rockets (unlike the Vietcong in Vietnam).

This falls short of a conclusive argument. Nothing seems to rule out the possibility of an anti-Assad outside agency loading up an ISO container (or a mule train) with CW (perhaps in rockets), and delivering them to an opposition group along with an adviser. (Not all the opposition groups all are allies.)

4th September: Germany

A German report includes:

  • Conjecture that the CW mix was stronger than intended, and hence lethal rather than temporarily disabling.
  • That a Hezbollah official said that Assad had ‘lost his nerve’ and ordered the attack.

It is not clear if the Hezbollah utterance was based on good grounds or was just speculation.

4th September: Experts

Some independent experts have given an analysis of the rockets that is similar in detail to that provided by Colin Powell to the UN in 2003, providing some support for the official dossiers. They asses that each warhead contained 50 litres (13 gallons) of agent. The assess that the rebels could have constructed the rockets, but not produced the large quantity of agents.

No figure is given for the number of rockets, but I have seen a figure of 100, which seems the right order of magnitude. This would imply 5,000 litres or 1,300 gallons, if all held the agent. A large tanker truck has a capacity of about 7 times this, so it does not seem impossible that such an amount could have been smuggled in.

This report essentially puts a little more detail on the blog of 31st August, and is seen as being more authoritative.

5th September: G20

The UK has confirmed that Sarin was used, but seems not to have commented on whether it was of typical ‘military quality’, or more home-made.

Russia has given the UN a 100 page dossier of its own, and I have yet to see a credible debunking (early days, and I haven’t found it on-line).

The squabbles continue. The UN wants to wait for its inspectors.

6th September: Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity

An alternative, unofficial narrative. Can this be shown to be incredible? Will it be countered?

9th September: German

German secret sources indicate that Assad had no involvement in the CW attack (although others in the regime might have).

9th September: FCO news conference

John Kerry, at a UK FCO news conference, gives very convincing account of the evidenced for CW use, but without indicating any evidence that the chemicals were delivered by rocket. He is asked about Assad’s involvement, but notes that all that is claimed is senior regime culpability.

UN Inspectors’ Report

21st September. The long-awaited report concludes that rockets were used to deliver Sarin. The report, at first read, seems professional and credible. It is similar in character to the evidence that Colin Powell presented to the UN in 2003, but without the questionable ‘judgments’. It provides some key details (type of rocket, trajectory) which – one hopes – could be tied to the Assad regime, especially given US claims to have monitored rocket launches. Otherwise, they appear to be of  type that the rebels could have used.

The report does not discuss the possibility, raised by the regime, that conventional rockets had accidentally hit a rebel chemical store, but the technical details do seem to rule it out. There is an interesting point here. Psychologically, the fact that the regime raised a possibility in their defence which has been shown to be false increases our scepticism about them. But mathematically, if they are innocent then we would not expect them to know what happened, and hence we would not expect their conjectures to be correct. Such a false conjecture could even be counted as evidence in their favour, particularly if we thought them competent enough to realise that such an invention would easily be falsified by the inspectors.

Reaction

Initial formal reactions

Initial reactions from the US, UK and French are that the technical details, including the trajectory, rule out rebel responsibility. They appear to be a good position to make such a determination, and it would normally be a conclusion that I would take at face value. But given the experience of Iraq and their previous dossiers, it seems quite possible that they would say what they said even without any specific evidence. A typical response, from US ambassador to the UN Samantha Power was:

The technical details of the UN report make clear that only the regime could have carried out this large-scale chemical weapons attack.”

Being just a little pedantic, this statement is literally false: one would at least have to take the technical details to a map showing rebel and regime positions, and have some idea of the range of the rockets. From the Russian comments, it would seem they have not been convinced.

Media reaction

A Telegraph report includes:

Whether the rebels have captured these delivery systems – along with sarin gas – from government armouries is unknown. Even if they have, experts said that operating these weapons successfully would be exceptionally difficult.

”It’s hard to say with certainty that the rebels don’t have access to these delivery systems. But even if they do, using them in such a way as to ensure that the attack was successful is the bit the rebels won’t know how to do,” said Dina Esfandiary, an expert on chemical weapons at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

The investigators had enough evidence to trace the trajectories followed by two of the five rockets. If the data they provide is enough to pinpoint the locations from which the weapons were launched, this should help to settle the question of responsibility.

John Kerry, the US secretary of state, says the rockets were fired from areas of Damascus under the regime’s control, a claim that strongly implicates Mr Assad’s forces.

This suggests that there might be a strong case against the regime. But it is not clear that the government would be the only source of weapons for the rebels, that the rebels would need sophisticated launchers (rather than sticks) or that they would lack advice. Next, given the information on type, timing and bearing it should be possible to identify the rockets, if the US was monitoring their trajectories at the time, and hence it might be possible to determine where they came from, in which case the evidence trail would lead strongly to the regime. (Elsewhere it has been asserted that one of the rockets was fired from within the main Syrian Army base, in which case one would have thought they would have noticed a rebel group firing out.)

17 September: Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch has marked the UN estimate of the trajectories on a map, clearly showing tha- they could have been fired from the Republican Guard 104 Brigade area.

Connecting the dots provided by these numbers allows us to see for ourselves where the rockets were likely launched from and who was responsible.

This isn’t conclusive, given the limited data available to the UN team, but it is highly suggestive and another piece of the puzzle.

This seems a reasonable analysis. The BBC has said of it:

Human Rights Watch says the document reveals details of the attack that strongly
suggest government forces were behind the attack.

But this seems to exaggerate the strength of the evidence. One would at least want to see if the trajectories are consistent with the rockets having been launched from rebel held areas (map, anyone?) It also seems a little odd that a salvo of M14 rockets appear to have been fired over the presidential palace. Was the Syrian Army that desperate? Depending on the view that one takes of these questions, the evidence could favour the rebel hypothesis. On the other hand, if the US could confirm that the only rockets fired at that time to those sites came from government areas, that would seem conclusive.

(Wikipedia gives technical details of rockets. It notes use by the Taliban, and quotes its normal maximum range as 9.8km. The Human Rights Watch analysis seems to be assuming that this will not be significantly reduced by the ad-hoc adaptation to carry gas. Is this credible? My point here is that the lack of explicit discussion of such aspects in the official dossiers leaves room for doubt, which could be dispelled if their ‘very high confidence’ is justified.)

18 September: Syrian “proof”

The BBC has reported that the Syrians have provide what they consider proof to the Russia that the rebels were responsible for the CW attack, and that the Russians are evaluating it. I doubt that this will be proof, but perhaps it will reduce our confidence in  the ‘very high’ likelihood that the regime was responsible. (Probably not!) It may, though, flush out more conclusive evidence, either way.

19 September: Forgery?

Assad has claimed that the materials recovered by the UN inspectors were forged. The report talks about rebels moving material, and it is not immediately clear, as the official dossiers claim, that this hypothesis is not credible, particularly if the rebels had technical support.

Putin has confirmed that the rockets used were obsolete Soviet-era ones, no longer in use by the Syrian Army.

December: US Intelligence?

Hersh claims that US had intelligence that the Syrian rebels had chemical weapons, and that the US administration  deliberately ‘adjusted’ the intelligence to make it appear much more damning of the Syrian regime. (This is disputed.)

Comment

The UN Inspectors report is clear about what it has found. It is careful not to make deductive leaps, but provides ample material to support further analysis. For example, while it finds that Sarin was delivered by rockets that could have been launched from a regime area, it does not rule out rebel responsibility. But it does give details of type, time and direction, such that if – as appears to be the case from their dossier – the US were monitoring the area, it should be possible to conclude that the rocket was actually fired by the regime. Maybe someone will assemble the pieces for us.

My own view is not that Assad did not do it or that we should not attack, but that any attack based on the grounds that Assad used CW should be supported by clear, specific evidence, which the dossiers prior to the UN report did not provide. Even now, we lack a complete case. Maybe the UN should have its own intelligence capability? Or could we attack on purely humanitarian grounds, not basing the justification on the possible events on 21 Aug? Or share our intelligence with the Russians and Chinese?

Maybe no-one is interested any more?

See Also

Telegraph on anti-spy cynicism. Letters. More controversially: inconclusive allegations. and an attempted debunking.

Discussion of weakness of case that Assad was personally involved. Speculation on UN findings.

A feature of the debate seems to be that those who think that ‘something must be done’ tend to be critical of those who question the various dossiers, and those who object to military action tend to throw mud at the dossiers, justified or not. So maybe my main point should be that, irrespective of the validity of the JIC assessment, we need a much better quality of debate, engaging the public and those countries with different views, not just our traditional allies.

A notable exception was a private blog, which looked very credible, but fell short claiming “high likelihood”. It gives details of two candidate delivery rockets, and hoped that the UN inspectors will have got evidence from them, as they did. Neither rocket was known to have been used, but neither do they appear to be beyond the ability of rebel groups to use (with support). The comments are also interesting, e.g.:

There is compelling evidence that the Saudi terrorists operating in Syria, some having had training from an SAS mercenary working out of Dubai who is reporting back to me, are responsible for the chemical attack in the Ghouta area of Damascus.

The AIPAC derived ‘red line’ little game and frame-up was orchestrated at the highest levels of the American administration and liquid sarin binary precursors mainly DMMP were supplied by Israeli handled Saudi terrorists to a Jabhat al-Nusra Front chemist and fabricator.

Israel received supplies of the controlled substance DMMP from Solkatronic Chemicals of Morrisville, Pa.

This at least has some detail, although not such as can be easily checked.

Finally, I am beginning to get annoyed by the media’s use of scare quotes around Russian “evidence”.

Dave Marsay